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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

COMIREX-M-26
21 February 1968

*Revised per 14-27
with changes on pages 4, 14, + 15*

The following is an index of the Minutes of the 21 February 1968
COMIREX meeting:

Page 4 Special Briefing - DIA Analysis of NVN Transportation
Activity in Christmas, New Year's,
and Tet

Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings and Reports on Operations)

Page 6 Operational Briefing--Satellite
6 Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East
8 Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

Section II (NPIC Report)

Page 10 Mission Highlights

Page 10 Special Report on Cambodia

Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

50X1

None

Section IV (Action Items)

Page 12 Operational Overlap of GAMBIT and CORONA
Missions

50X1

Page 13 Importance of Locating the USS PUEBLO

50X1

Page 13 Phase III Reporting under the National Tasking Plan

Page 14

Copy 67 of 68

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Control Systems Jointly

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TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-26

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Section IV (Continued)

Page 14



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Page 15

Status of Revision of LOC Targets (COMOR-D-25/207,
COMIREX-M-10, page 14, para. 3 and M-11, page 19

Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

None

Section VI (Other Business)


Page 17

Chairman's Comments on Reconnaissance Planning
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COMIREX-M-26

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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

Minutes of Meeting Held in Beige Room

1000-1230, Wednesday, 21 February 1968

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PRESIDING

Chairman

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MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. L. A. Moyer, Jr., State

Col. R. W. Kane, AFNIN

DIA

Mr. J. C. St. Cyr, OACSI

Capt. B. L. Garbow, ONI

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CONSULTANTS PRESENT

DIA

DIA

Lt. Col. P. M. Bennett, OACSI

Col. E. F. Sweeney, AFNIN

Lt. Col. N. D. Thurman, AFNIN

NPIC

NPIC

NPIC

Executive Secretary

O/Chairman, COMIREX

Ch/Imagery Exploitation Subcommittee

Ch/National Imagery Data Base Working Group

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COMIREX-M-26

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Special Briefing

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DIA Analysis of NVN Transportation Activity in Christmas,
New Year's, and Tet

1. [] introduced [] and requested that he follow the NPIC briefing on mission highlights with a presentation that had already been made available to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The summary presented below in effect provides some additional information to the NPIC briefing of 25 January 1968, COMIREX-M-24, page 8, para 2.

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2. [] opened his briefing with a reminder to COMIREX that the bombing pauses for the three periods, Christmas, New Year's, and Tet had been 24 hours, 36 hours, and 36 hours respectively. He pointed out that even these hours were deceptive relative to photo reconnaissance activities since they ^{represented only} began at 6 p.m. and ended at 6 a.m. [] also noted that the activity between the periods would of necessity be dissimilar because during the Tet truce bombing was only suspended north of Vinh.

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3. When added to the evidence previously presented by NPIC, the primary impact of [] briefing was to re-emphasize the very considerable effort made during the Christmas and New Year's truces to move supplies to the South, correctly anticipating that their actions would cut short the Tet truce. Major advantage was taken of truck and inland waterway facilities. Unlike the longer truces of last year, no attempt was made to use coastal shipping. Rail shipping was complicated south of Thanh Hoa because of damage to the rail lines. Between Thanh Hoa and Vinh trucks with wheel flanges were pulling rail cars, south of Vinh rail transportation became quite difficult.

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4. Interestingly enough the North Vietnamese have concentrated quite heavily in using village complexes to conceal both rail and truck transportation. Freight cars halted in villages during the day have been quite well concealed. In the case of trucks it is of course a ^{necessary} good deal easier to disperse and conceal during daylight hours.


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
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5. Another impressive aspect of the North Vietnamese effort was their ability to use water transportation in such situations as the gap in Route 1A and also to restore bridges for concentrated use in the truce period. Another example of the stupendous human effort involved was demonstrated in the instance of the relationship between Thien Ki, Thanh Hoa, and Vinh. To make best use of trucks they apparently run the thirty miles from Thien Ki to Thanh Hoa at night, offload there, and return empty. The next night trucks which have presumably been returned empty from Vinh load at Thien Ki and then make the shorter run to Vinh. The manpower involved in this operation is staggering but it does prevent the whole supply chain from being halted by one interdiction point.  emphasized that in addition to the deception and ingenious make-shift practices of the North Vietnamese there are some solid aspects of improvement in the supply picture. POL trucks are beginning to appear, an improvement over dumping and storing 55-gallon drums, and the number of barges and landing craft which are being brought into North Vietnam have added tremendously to the efficiency of utilization of the inland waterways.

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6.  concluded his briefing with a summary of vehicle sightings, estimate of material in transit, and conclusions. These will be made available as addenda to these minutes.

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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings and Reports on Operations)

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Operational Briefing -- Satellite

1. [redacted] reported the satellite operations scheduling as of 21 February as follows:

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GAMBIT

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CORONA

1046 - 13 March 1968

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Report on Aircraft Activities -- Far East

2. [redacted] reported on BLACK SHIELD missions as follows:

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a. BLACK SHIELD Mission BX6851 was flown over North Vietnam on 16 February 1968. This mission was designed for two passes but due to adverse weather in the target area, only the first pass was flown.

b. BLACK SHIELD Mission BX6852 was alerted for 17 February 1968. Weather forecast predicted favorable conditions in the target area which did not materialize and the mission was cancelled.

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COMIREX-M-26

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c. BLACK SHIELD Mission BX6853 was flown over North Korea on 19 February 1968. This was a two-pass mission which provided coverage from the DMZ to approximately 3945 North latitude.

3.  reported photographic coverage achieved against two South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

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a. Coverage of lines of communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam was decreased from 178 to 146 (see Section IV, para 10, for additional information). For the period 8-14 February, surveillance coverage was reported on Hoa Lac Airfield and the port facilities at Cam Pha and Hon Gay. For the period 8-21 February, surveillance coverage was reported on 10 priority targets in North Vietnam. Targets covered in the two periods are underlined in Tab A.


b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/220, 23 May 1967 and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967). The area coverage reported obtained between 23 January - 19 February 1968 consisted of five BUMBLE BUG missions and is displayed on the maps at Tab B. The complete readout of a BLACK SHIELD mission, flown 15 February, has not yet been accomplished, however, a preliminary scan of the film revealed no SSM activity in the area.

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4.  summarized BUMBLE BUG activities for the period 9-21 February as shown below:

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COMIREX-M-26

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Areas/Targets</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
9 Feb	Q426		Lost
	Q409		Recovered in water
11 Feb	Q640	South China/Laos	Successful, MARS
12 Feb	Q425		Did not return
13 Feb	Q428	Rail line Nam Dinh to Vinh	Air aborted after 53 min., 1800 ft. of film taken, MARS
14 Feb	Q416	Haiphong Area/Cat Bi AF	Successful, MARS
16 Feb	Q435		Did not return
18 Feb	Q436	Rail lines Phu ly-Hanoi Hanoi-Bac Giang	Successful, MARS

5. The DIA member advised that two additional drones had been scheduled for flights to cover the South China airfields but have not been flown.

6. No FOOD FAIR flights were scheduled between 9 and 21 February.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

7. reported GLASS LAMP activities, 9-21 February, as follows:

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COMIREX-M-26

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
9 Feb	G013	Successful, 2.4% coverage
11 Feb	G014	Successful, 23.2% coverage

Recap

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Net</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
G013	9 Feb	2.4%	89.7%
G014	11 Feb	23.2%	91.1%

The 56-day reporting period terminated on 18 February 1968. Next reporting period will run from 19 February 1968 through 14 April 1968.

8. [] advised COMIREX that in the 25 December 1967 to 18 February 1968 period the cumulative area coverage amounted to 91%. 178 of 183 targets were covered giving a score in this respect of 97%.

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COMIREX-M-26

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Section II (NPIC Report)Mission Highlights50X1

1.  reported first on the disappearance of the USS PUEBLO. He pointed out that the photography of 1045 showed that it was no longer in the position established in BX 6847. There was a possibility, however, that a vessel berthed at the  might be the PUEBLO.  then reported on the later evidence from BX 6853. There was no vessel at the latter location and a search of the general  area and other coastal areas failed to reveal the location of the USS PUEBLO. In this connection, although the port facility is cloud free,  harbor is about 30 per cent cloud covered and there are other small cloud covered areas. However, the possibility that the PUEBLO could be hidden by a cloud in the general area of her previous anchorage, that shown on BX 6847, would appear to be very slight.

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2. From 1045  He noted that this is the fifth new airfield in Egypt.

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3.  showed a map depicting the microwave nets in the USSR as presently known. 

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4.  showed the area of North Korea covered by the two east to west passes of BX 6853 and noted that a new SAM had been located near 

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Special Report on Cambodia

5.  distributed to members an NPIC think-piece "Photographic Interpretation Memorandum on Probable Communist Activity in Northeast Cambodia" (NPIC-29/68, Feb 1968).  advised members that NPIC's growing concern with evidences of the use of Northeast Cambodia for Communist communications and

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military storage had prompted NPIC to send a cable to the community, inviting particular attention to this problem. This action was followed by the think-piece.

6. [] showed maps and photography and pointed out evidences of Communist activity in the form of new roads, bypasses, bridges, truck parks established under trees, suspect storage areas, concealed huts and a number of other signs of Cambodian participation not previously observed in this area. In certain areas a number of 2x4 crates were observed, and the general pattern of widened trails, multiple trails, and even row cropping were all more typical of Laos than Cambodia. Route 110 has now been pushed through Cambodia into South Vietnam. [] pointed out further indications of insurgency with photographs of foxholes and automatic weapons positions which were very similar to Viet Cong positions established in South Vietnam and must, therefore, connote a belligerent capability.

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COMIREX-M-26

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Section IV (Action Items)Operational Overlap of GAMBIT and CORONA Missions

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1. Referring to the satellite operations schedule presented by [] the acting CIA member noted that GAMBIT Mission [] followed by the launch of CORONA Mission 1046 on 13 March. [] wished to record CIA's concern with simultaneous operation of missions as opposed to the principle of interleaving previously endorsed by the COMIREX. The acting CIA member conceded that simultaneous coverage on occasion has provided some bonus benefits but on general principles more gain is to be expected from a reduction in days of overlap and the consequent increase in days of unique coverage. He specifically noted that the full value of interrelationships between the KH-4 and KH-8, and the advantages of maximum continuity of coverage, are lost when missions are flown simultaneously. He further noted the adverse effects on processing and readout facilities. [] observed that the overlap seems to have been increasing and noted that in addition to the conflict in March there might be a similar duplication of coverage in April.

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2. [] suggested that COMIREX note that NRO is planning to launch eight CORONA and eight GAMBIT missions during the year. The guidance provided to NRO suggests: that overlap be reduced; that there be 45-day intervals between the missions; that launches take advantage of the best weather conditions in important target areas; that missions be limited in number when bad light precludes coverage of targets in the northern hemisphere; that there be a minimum of three days between the recovery of mission or buckets; that there be sufficient time to feed the results of a CORONA into the programming of a GAMBIT. [] added that an additional complicating factor is that both the GAMBIT and CORONA missions can now fly longer and on orbit life can be expected to increase in the future. [] observed that, whereas the purpose of the guidance is thoroughly understood by the NRO, it is impossible to

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COMIREX-M-26

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meet all considerations. At present there will tend to be overlaps in March and April and again in October and January 1969.

3. The acting CIA member asked [] whether it might be possible to move either one of the March missions and one of the April missions to the end of the month. [] suggested that if the CORONA mission was postponed to the end of the month it would mean that there had been no CORONA coverage between the end of January and quite far into April. He also advised that the CORONA could not be advanced, an alternative proposed by the Chairman, because the []

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[] In concluding discussion of the present scheduling, the Chairman felt that [] should be commended for an adroit juggling of the unintentionally complex guidance provided by COMIREX, and noted that, with regard to recovery of 1046 [] he will still give NPIC its three-day interval. As it is obviously impossible to meet each item of COMIREX guidance, trade-offs are necessary. In reply to a suggestion by the Chairman, [] agreed to examine the relative importance of some of these trade-offs and to submit for COMIREX consideration alternate suggestions on scheduling for April, and later in the year.

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Importance of Locating the USS PUEBLO

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4. The Chairman noted that a composite analysis of photography from 1045 and that procured by BLACK SHIELD Mission 6853 failed to reveal the whereabouts of the USS PUEBLO. The chance that she might have been moved again to her January 26th position and might have swung to anchor under virtually the sole cloud in the [] area did not seem very realistic. [] requested members, [] in particular, to examine the importance of locating the PUEBLO and to provide him with a reading on this as soon as possible.

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Phase III Reporting under the National Tasking Plan

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5. The Chairman passed to members and to [] for the Director, NPIC a draft memorandum, dated 20 February 1968, suggesting steps that might be taken to continue with optimum production

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COMIREX-M-26

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of Phase III reports while work continues toward final allocation of responsibilities of Basic Phase III. [redacted] requested that those receiving the draft telephone suggestions if any to him as soon as possible so that he may sign and distribute the final memorandum.

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COMIREX-M-26

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Status of Revision of LOC Targets (COMOR-D-25/207, COMIREX-M-10, page 14, para. 3 and M-11, page 19)

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10. [redacted] reported that he had been advised by Mr. Bothwell, with regard to a long standing request to review the LOC requirement, that a general revaluation was completed of the priority targets in South China. The individual targets were reviewed in terms of their significance to provide early warning of ChiCom intentions. The results of this review were threefold:

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a. Deletion from the list of 9 airfields, 3 naval facilities, 15 ground force installations, 4 industrial complexes and the unidentified installation at I Chun. As a result, the total number of priority targets decreased from 178 to 146.

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COMIREX-M-26

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b. Nineteen Priority 1 targets were lowered to Priority 2 and two Priority 2 targets were raised to Priority 1.

c. Four of the 32 deleted targets had not received base line coverage, thus the total targets that require base line coverage decreased from 13 to 9.

A similar review of the North Vietnam targets is currently in progress, and should be completed in the near future.

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COMIREX-M-26

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50X1Section VI (Other Business)Chairman's Comments on Reconnaissance Planning Group

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1. [] outlined to members the establishment and purpose of the Reconnaissance Planning Group, as well as the membership and why the membership had been set up as it was.

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[] reported that the Chairman, Mr. James Q. Reber, had called an exploratory meeting on the 12th of February.

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[] advised that he had emphasized certain points to the RPG which he considered required some action. These were:

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a. Need to examine scientific and technical requirements. Thus far, he felt the examination had been too confined to the limitations imposed by the highest resolution reconnaissance system available at the time.

b. The need for high resolution periodic surveillance.

c. Search requirements.

d. Indications. [] recognized that the Board had transmitted to the NRO a statement for its examination.

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e. Mapping and charting, although at the moment there is a valid USIB statement of requirements in this field.

f. The use of intelligence assets to meet civilian needs; to wit, the ARGO report.

[] concluded by informing COMIREX that he was forwarding to RPG a "think piece." This memorandum is to be accompanied by charts showing a series of alternative mixes of coverage that might be planned starting with FY 1970.

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2. [redacted] noted that work is going forward on several of the items mentioned by him but there are also some problems. The question of higher resolution continues to be somewhat elusive despite the fact that there have been a number of assaults on the problem for at least four or five years. [redacted] then suggested that members give some thought to the use of intelligence assets to meet civilian needs, primarily environmental studies. Plans are under way to perpetuate ARGO, and it may be appropriate at some time in the future to establish a working party under COMIREX to consider needs for environmental information. The acting CIA member agreed that there must be a close liaison with COMIREX but suggested that further consideration of this be postponed until after the 6 March ARGO seminar. Concrete thoughts as to how to tackle this may come from further education to be expected from these briefings and discussions.

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Executive Secretary

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments

Tabs A and B

Copies 5, 6	State TCO
7	DIA [redacted]
8, 9, 10, 11	DIA TCO
12, 13	OACSI TCO
14, 15	ONI TCO
16, 17, 18, 19	AFNIN TCO
20, 21	NSA TCO
22, 23, 24	NRO TCO

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
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HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
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Tab B

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
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HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE

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Tab B 1

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
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3 TCO DCI Liaison Officer, SecDef
4 Dr. Donald Steininger, Executive Office Building
25  50X1
26 DDP TCO
27-29 CIA COMIREX Member
30,31 Ch/ICRS
32 Special Center TCO
33 ONE TCO
34 IRS ReqBr/RecceGrp
35 OBI TCO
36-38 D/OSR
39-48 Asst Ops/NPIC
49 COMIREX Staff  50X1
50 Ch/EXRAND
51 D/IAS
52 TSO CIA
53 DDS&T  50X1
54 ASA/DCI/NIPE
55 D/OSI
56 ExSec/SORS/OSI
57 D/ILSS/DDS&T
58 D/OSP
59 D/OEL
60 D/SA
61 D/O/OSA
62 Intel/O/OSA
63 D/FMSAC
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